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The need for auditors‟ independence is very crucial for the success of audit 
process. Independence of the auditors manifests in technical, investigative 
and reporting forms. For the audit report to be publicly accepted as 
reflecting the true and fair view the auditors must be seen to be indeed truly 
independent. One way the auditor‟s independence manifests is in the nature 
of audit report issued by the auditors. This study therefore examines the 
nexus between the auditor‟s independence and the nature of audit report 
issued. Using audit fees as a measure of audit independence we examined the 
relationship between the audit fees and the nature of audit reports of Twenty-
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Seven (27) publicly quoted companies in Nigerian Stock Exchange between 
2002 and 2006 period. The results of the analysis show that there is a 
positive but insignificant relationship between the auditor independence        
(measured by audit fees) and the nature of the audit reports issued by the 
auditors. Most of the companies under investigations issued unqualified audit 
reports. Since audit fee is used to estimate independence it therefore means 
that the higher the audit fee the lower the auditor independence and the 
higher the incidence of issuing unqualified audit reports.  
Key words: Auditor independence, audit fees, audit report, qualified audit 
report, and unqualified audit report. 
Introduction 
Auditor independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession since it is 
the foundation of the public‘s trust in the accounting profession (Lindberg & 
Beck, 2004). Auditor independence is a crucial element in the statutory 
corporate reporting process and a key prerequisite for the adding of value to 
audited financial statements (Mautz & Saharaf, 1961:16). Baker (2005:11) 
identifies auditor independence as the independence from the parties that 
have an interest in the financial statements of a reporting entity. Auditor 
independence is an attitude of mind characterized by integrity and an 
objective approach to the audit process.  The purpose of an audit is to 
enhance the credibility of financial statements by providing written 
reasonable assurance from independent sources that the financial statements 
present a true and fair view in accordance with the accounting standards. This 
objective will not be met if users of the audit report believe that the auditor 
may have been influenced by other parties, more specifically the enterprise 
managers/directors or by conflicting interests (e.g. if the auditor owns shares 
in the company to be audited). In addition to technical competence, auditor 
independence appears to be the most important factor in establishing the 
credibility of the audit opinion. Since 2000, a wave of high profile 
accounting scandals (such as Enron in the United States of America and HIH 
Insurance in Australia) have cast the profession into the limelight, negatively 
affecting the public perception of auditor independence and the overall value 
of auditing. 
There are three main ways in which the auditor‘s independence can manifest 
itself: Programming independence, investigative independence and reporting 
independence (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; & Dunn, 1996). While programming 
independence protects auditors‘ ability to select appropriate strategies, 
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investigative independence protects the auditor‘s ability to implement the 
strategies in whatever manner they consider necessary. Reporting 
independence protects the auditors‘ ability to choose to reveal to the public 
any information they believe should be disclosed. 
There are two important aspects of independence which must be 
distinguished from each other: independence in fact (real independence) and 
independence in appearance (perceived independence). Together, both forms 
are essential to achieve the goals of independence. For the public to conclude 
that the audit report represents a true and fair view the auditor must not only 
acts independently but appears independent too. Thus, how the public would 
receive the audit reports depends on how they perceive the auditors in terms 
of independence. The threat to auditors‘ independence stems from two main 
sources: the auditors‘ relationship with the company and the nature of the 
accountancy profession. The economic bonding between the auditors and the 
clients as the auditors obtain their income from audit service may make 
auditors to be subservient and not be to stand independent to confront the 
directors who negotiate audit contracts with the auditors. Hence, so long as 
the client determines audit appointments and fees an auditor will never be 
able to have complete economic independence. If auditors feel that the 
income from a specific client is important than their responsibilities to 
shareholders they may not perform the audit with the shareholders‘ interests 
in mind. The larger the fee income the more likely the auditor is to shirk his 
responsibilities and perform the audit without independence. Again, audit 
firms may on some occasions quote low prices to directors to ensure repeat 
business, or to get new clients. By doing so the firm may not be able to 
perform the audit fully as they do not have enough income to pay for a 
thorough investigation. Cutting corners could mean the audit team would be 
reporting without all the evidence required which will affect the quality of 
the report. This would bring into question their independence. How do we 
then measure audit independence if high audit fees or low audit fees could 
jeopardize auditor‘s independence? How does audit report relate to the 
auditor‘s independence? These are the questions for investigation in this 
study. 
The Audit report is the final outcome of the audit process and is the only 
external communication of what the auditor has done and concluded during 
the audit (McGrath, Siegel, Dunfee, Glazer and Jaenicke, 2004:39). The audit 
report communicates the auditor‘s findings to outsiders and plays a crucial 
role in warning financial statements users of impeding problems with the 
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firm‘s financial reporting or internal controls, including going concern 
problems. However, for the audit opinion to play a credible role as a warning 
signal, the auditor must be able to objectively evaluate the firm‘s 
performance and withstand any client pressure to issue a clean opinion.  
The decision on what type of audit report to render to the clients is the final 
cumulative audit decision and is subject to a considerable amount of 
professional judgment and negotiation with the clients. As such, it captures 
the possible influence that close auditor- client relationships might have on 
the auditor‘s personal judgment and their behaviour in the negotiation. Thus, 
if auditors are independent, it will be seen from the nature of audit reports 
issued by the auditors. The audit report will have no value unless auditors can 
programme their work in the most appropriate manner, conduct 
investigations without restrictions and report their findings clearly and 
objectively. The appearance of independence is at least as important as the 
auditor‘s attitude, although it may well be that readers or users of the audit 
reports are forced to rely on the auditor‘s integrity to a greater extent than 
they would wish.  
The questions then arise as follows: 
i) Does auditor independence affect the nature of audit report? 
ii) Will increased auditor independence lead to a true and fair audit 
report? 
iii) Will audit fees affect auditor independence? 
Going by the above research questions, the study aims at examining the 
relationship between auditor independence and the nature of audit report and, 
assessing the impact of auditor‘s independence on the nature of audit report. 
Review of literature 
A fairly large volume of literature has accumulated on the relationship 
between auditor‘s independence and the nature of audit report.  Several 
models have been developed in the literature that try to give some direction 
on the relationship between auditor‘s independence and the nature of audit 
report as well as the effect of auditor‘s independence on the nature of audit 
report (Salehi, 2008 & 2010).  
Prior research provides mixed evidences on the relationship between fees and 
(qualified) audit opinions. It has been observed that the more economically 
dependent the auditor is on the client, the more likely the auditor is to 
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succumb to client pressure (Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley, 2002; Trompeter, 
1994). Mautz and Sharaf (1961:18) recognize the auditor‘s financial 
dependence on clients as a built-in-anti-independence factor.  They further 
observe that since auditors are financially dependent on the client, their 
independence as regards the financial reports might be reduced. DeAngelo 
(1981:82) argues that future economic interest in a client reduces the 
auditor‘s independence towards the client.  In other words, the greater the 
client-specific quasi-rent stream, the less likely the auditor is to report a 
discovered breach. 
Wines (1994) suggests that high audit fees would impair auditor 
independence. Using a sample of 76 large Australian public firms over 1980 -
1989 period, he finds that non-audit fee dependence is related to a reduced 
likelihood of qualification. Trumpeter (1994:56) in his study on auditor‘s 
independence and audit partner judgment observed that in instances where 
auditor‘s independence is compromised, auditors are less likely to require 
downward adjustments for important clients than for relatively unimportant 
clients.  He suggests that partners with compensation more closely tied to 
client retention are less likely to require downward adjustments to income 
than partners with compensation less closely tied to client retention.  
Similarly, Basioudis, Papakonstantinous, and Geiger (2006) using  a sample 
of 29 financially distressed U.K. firms find out that firms with high audit fees 
are more likely to receive a going concern modified audit opinion, whereas 
firms with high non-audit fees are less likely to receive a going concern 
modified opinion.  
Wallman (2006) posits that auditor independence should be examined at the 
office level where the important audit decisions regarding individual clients 
are made.  He stated that when auditors of a company are in conflict with the 
directors, it is important this conflict should be resolved without losing any of 
their independence.  He also explained that this can prove to be difficult as 
auditors earn fees from providing a service, which is how they earn a living.  
The audit fees are paid by the board of directors leaving them with the power 
in the auditors-clients relationships.  The question often asked is how can the 
audit teams please the directors without losing any of their independence but 
keep the directors happy to ensure and maintain repeat business? 
There are some studies which show no auditor‘s independence impairment as 
a result of high audit fees. Some prior research suggests that client fee 
dependence does not appear to compromise auditor objectivity for publicly 
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listed companies in the United States and Australia (DeFond et al. 2002; 
Craswell et al. 2002) and for private firms in Norway (Hope and Langli, 
2007).  
DeFond, Raghunadan, and Subramanyam (2002) examine the relation 
between audit and non-audit fees and the issuance of a going concern audit 
opinion. Using a sample of 1,158 financially distressed publicly listed U.S. 
firms in 2001–2002, they find no association between fees and impaired 
auditor independence because of the auditors‘ concern for loss of reputation 
and litigation costs. Craswell, Stokes, and Laughton (2002) also find similar 
results from a sample of Australian firms. Hope and Langli (2007) analysed 
the relationship between auditor fees and auditors‘ propensity to issue a 
going concern opinion. Contrary to the regulators‘ concern, the study 
provides no evidence that auditors compromise their objectivity through fee 
dependence. 
In summary, it is evident that there is a close nexus between the 
independence of auditors and the propensity to qualify or not qualify audit 
reports. We know that audit reports will lack credibility if auditors appear to 
lack professional independence. However, the results from the empirical 
studies from the developed countries appear inconclusive and very little is 
known in the developing countries such as Nigeria and this is what 
necessitates the need for this present study. 
Research methodology 
In this study, auditor‘s independence and audit reports which are the two 
main issues discussed have to be analysed and measured so that the 
relationship between both can be established.  Auditor‘s independence, which 
is the independence of the auditor from parties that have interests in the 
financial statements of an entity, is proxied by audit fee, which is the 
dependent variable while the explanatory variable is the nature of audit 
report. The auditor‘s independence function is therefore expressed as 
follows: 
  AI = ʄ (NAR) 
where,  
  AI = AF 
  AI = Auditor Independence 
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  TAF = Total audit fees 
  NAR = Nature of Audit report 
  AF  = Audit Fees 
However, other extraneous variables that impact on auditor‘s independence 
are: personal relationship with the client, non-audit services (NAS), audit 
firm tenure, audit partner tenure and alumni affiliation.  These factors reduce 
the propensity of issuing an unqualified audit report (Mikol and Standish, 
2008:72).  The data used in this study were obtained from the reports of 
twenty seven quoted companies in Nigeria between 2004 and 2008, which is 
a period of five years. 
Data analysis and interpretation of results 
The empirical relationships between auditor‘s independence (proxied by 
audit fees) and the nature of audit report were examined. The activities of 
twenty-seven quoted firms, the representative sample of study in the period 
2002 – 2006, has witnessed significant variations brought about by the 
impact of the determinants of audit reports presented by auditors. In this 
study, the determinants are audit report and audit fees of each company 
respectively.  A careful analysis of the variations in the nature of audit report, 
verified that audit report varied positively with these determinants between 
2002 and 2006 but had no significant relationship. 
It is observed that between year 2002 and year 2006, audit reports were 
mostly unqualified implying that the financial statements brought before the 
auditors presented true and fair view of the states of affairs of the companies. 
The results obtained using the Prise-Winsten estimation method is presented 
in a tabular form below: 
Table 1: Results of Regression Analysis 









    =          0.021                   Adjusted R
2
  =  0.006 
F      =         2.8391                  DW-Statistic  = 1.984 
Source: Authors (2010) 
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Before interpreting the regression results, it is imperative that the following 
diagnostics are examined.  The R
2
 value of 0.021 indicates that about 2% of 
the systematic variation in the nature of audit reports is explained by the 
changes in audit fees.  This is not a good fit as about 98% systematic 
variation in the nature of audit reports is left unaccountable for by the model. 
The value of adjusted R
2
 which equals 0.006 indicates that the model 
explains about 0.6% systematic variation in the nature of audit report. 
In support of the above, the F-statistic measures the overall significance of 
the model, that is, whether R
2
 = 0.021 is different from zero.  The R
2
 value of 
0.021 is different from zero and it is not statistically significant at 5% and 1% 
levels of significance.  This shows that the slope coefficient is not statistically 
significant, which implies that there is no linear relationship between the 
independent variable (audit fees) and the dependent variable (the nature of 
audit report).  The Durbin-Watson statistic was also employed as a model 
to test for auto- correlation and partial auto-correlation.  The regression 
results shows DW = 1.984, which indicates the absence of first order serial 
correlation. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the audit fee is correct.  The t-
statistics of the slope coefficient of audit fees computed is 1.686 and it has 
observed that it is not significant at 5% and 1% levels of significance.  In 
particular, a percentage point increase in the audit fees improves the nature of 
audit reports by 7.98 percentage points. It could be observed from the 
findings of this study that there exist a positive but not significant 
relationship between audit fees and the nature of audit reports during the 
period under review. 
It is however true that other factors may impact on the nature of audit reports, 
though they are not within the model specified.  Lengthy audit firm tenure, 
audit-client relationship, provision of non-audit services (NAS), and alumni 
affiliation, all affect the nature of audit reports issued by the auditor. 
Summary, recommendations and conclusion 
We have empirically investigated and attempted to ascertain the impact of 
audit fees on the nature of audit report of public quoted companies in 
Nigeria.  In this study, data were collected from the firms‘ Annual Reports 
and Accounts for the period 2002 – 2006 to obtain various auditor‘s opinions 
and audit fees for the period under study. 
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From the findings, it was observed that the financial statements of public 
quoted companies in Nigeria is premised on several factors, which  
determines the nature of audit reports given by the auditors. We observed that 
audit fee (AF) has a positive but insignificant correlation with the nature of 
audit report. 
This study shows that there is a positive relationship between the nature of 
audit report and the audit fees over the period under study.   Drawing from 
the research findings, the under-mentioned recommendations have been 
developed to serve as measures for improving the nature of audit reports. Our 
study reveals that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between 
auditor‘s independence and the nature of audit reports. While suggesting that 
this research work expresses a highly intelligent guide to determining the 
nature of audit reports of public quoted companies in Nigeria, interested 
parties are hereby advised to conduct more research on this area, as 
improvement will be highly appreciated. 
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Table1: Companies and Audit Fees Paid (2002- 2006) 
























2 Berger Paints Nig. 
Plc 
    
2,250,000  
   
3,420,000  
   
4,250,000  
   
4,900,000  
   
5,155,000  
3 West African 
Portland Cement 










4 Ashaka Cement 
plc 
    
4,200,000  
   
6,000,000  
   
6,000,000  




5 Presco Plc     
1,700,000  
   
2,000,000  
   
2,000,000  
   
3,100,000  
   
5,800,000  
6 African Petroleum 
Plc 










7 May and Baker 
Nigeria Plc 
    
2,000,000  
   
2,100,000  
   
3,600,000  
   
5,700,000  
   
8,000,000  
8 First Bank of 
Nigeria Plc 










9 United Bank for 
Africa (UBA) Plc 






























12 Dunlop Nigeria 
Plc 
    
5,000,000  
   
4,790,000  
   
5,200,000  
   
7,300,000  
   
9,150,000  










14 Mobil Oil Plc     
5,500,000  
   
7,618,000  
   
9,003,000  
   
8,418,000  
   
9,200,000  
15 Texaco Nigeria 
Plc 
    
4,427,000  
   
6,799,000  






16 Glaxomithkline      
4,300,000  
   
6,000,000  
   
7,200,000  
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17 Evans medical Plc     
3,500,000  
   
3,500,000  
   
4,000,000  
   
6,200,000  
   
7,500,000  
18 Unilever Nigeria 
Plc 
    
8,500,000  








19 Japaul oil        
650,000  
      
650,000  
      
500,000  
      
720,000  
   
1,200,000  
20 Jos International 
Breweries Plc 
    
1,150,000  
   
1,150,000  
   
3,700,000  
   
5,720,000  
   
6,000,000  










22 Guiness Nigeria 
Plc 
    
5,850,000  








23 Total Fina Elf     
6,200,000  








24 Nestle Foods     
6,300,000  








25 Okomu oil     
1,400,000  
   
1,600,000  
   
2,500,000  
   
3,200,000  
   
4,000,000  
26 Seven Up Bolting 
company 
    
5,500,000  
   
6,000,000  
   
5,500,000  
   
6,500,000  
   
7,500,000  
27 University Press        
750,000  
   
1,000,000  
   
1,000,000  
   
1,200,000  
   
1,600,000  
 
Table 2: Companies, Their Auditors and Types of Audit Reports  
S/N Name Of 
Companies 
Auditors 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 




1 1 1 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 
4 Ashaka Cement plc Akintola Williams 
Deloitte 
1 1 1 1 1 
5 Presco Plc Akintola Williams 
Deloitte 
1 1 1 1 1 




3 3 3 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 
9 United Bank for 
Africa (UBA) Plc 
Akintola Williams 
Deloitte 
1 1 1 1 1 
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10 Afribank plc Akintola Williams 
Deloitte 
1 3 3 1 1 
11 Union bank plc Akintola Williams 
Deloitte 
1 1 3 1 1 
12 Dunlop Nigeria Plc Ernest and Young 1 1 1 1 1 
13 Oando plc PriceWater House 
Coopers 
1 2 1 1 1 
14 Mobil Oil Plc PriceWater House 
Coopers 
1 1 1 1 1 
15 Texaco Nigeria Plc PriceWater House 
Coopers 
1 1 1 1 1 
16 Glaxomithkline  PriceWater House 
Coopers 
1 1 1 1 1 
17 Evans medical Plc PriceWater House 
Coopers 
1 1 1 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 
19 Japaul oil Ugboaja,  Martins 
and Co 
1 1 1 1 1 




1 1 1 1 1 
21 Wema Bank Plc KPMG Audit 1 1 1 1 1 
22 Guiness Nigeria 
Plc 
KPMG Audit 1 1 1 1 1 
23 Total Fina Elf KPMG Audit 1 1 1 1 1 
24 Nestle Foods KPMG Audit 1 1 1 1 1 
25 Okomu oil Spiropoulos 
Adiele, Okpara & 
Co 
1 1 1 1 1 
26 Seven Up Bolting 
company 
Egunjobi, 
Adegbite and Co 
1 1 1 1 1 
27 University Press Oyediran Faleye 
Oke and co 
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